Abstract: This article explores evidentiality (or the linguistic marking of source of information), a topic that has received little attention in studies on the history of English. Using witness depositions from the witch trials in Salem, MA, in 1692-1693 as material, the article reveals that a number of linguistic features are used to indicate source of information, especially verb phrases (e.g. see, hear, tell) and prepositional phrases (e.g. to my knowledge, in my sight). It also shows that direct sensory experience and reports are the most common semantic categories of evidentiality in the documents, while inference and assumption are relatively uncommon. I argue that the depositions use evidential marking in different situations to fulfill a variety of pragmatic functions. For example, the witnesses refer to direct experience (seeing) of the affliction by the apparitions of alleged witches to bring greater credibility to allegations that could usually not be substantiated. More generally, the article demonstrates how concepts such as discourse community, setting, and pragmatic concerns, which have not been systematically considered in studies on early English in North America, are crucial factors for our understanding of the use of English in the period.
Introduction
For speakers of some languages, marking evidentiality, that is, where the information that they are reporting on comes from, can be of utmost importance.
1 Speakers of Aymara, a language of South America, for example, may be "branded as arrogant liars" unless they signal with overt linguistic cues whether their statement is based on sensory evidence, on hearsay, or on inference (Aikhenvald 2004, 18, 335) . This is in stark contrast to English. Although English has the resources to mark evidentiality, they are far from obligatory. In fact, most of the time, language users only indicate the source of information in a vague manner, leave it to be inferred from the context of the statement, or give no clues at all (cf. Palmer 1986, 85) . If a language user made a statement as in (1a), (1a) The witch was in the house.
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to as epistemic modality (see esp. Willett 1988, 52-56; de Haan 1999, 85-87; see also Palmer 1986, 51-54, 69-70) . This merger or overlap is frequently found in studies or discussions of English, such as, among others, Chafe (1986) , Biber and Finegan (1988; , Stygall (1994) , Palander-Collin (1999) , Taavitsainen (2001) , and Precht (2003) . In fact, in studies adopting this approach, source of information usually takes a back seat to or is excluded completely in favor of epistemic meanings or features (esp. modal auxiliaries). Frequently, then, evidentiality is used simply as an alternative term for epistemic modality. Even though some typology scholars also suggest that evidentials may have epistemic meanings or extensions, they emphasize the primacy of the source marking, showing that evidentials do not always have epistemic meanings, or that, in some languages, evidentials never have epistemic extensions (see e.g. Aikhenvald 2004, 6-7) .
The starting point of this study is the narrower approach since the main goal is to investigate what linguistic resources are used to mark the source of information and what type of source is indicated. At the same time, I will consider the possible epistemic meanings that an evidential may have in a particular context. Indeed, it will become clear that the reason for marking the source often appears to be pragmatically conditioned, that is, evidentials may for example be used to emphasize or downplay the reliability of the evidence given in certain contexts. The overlap between evidentiality and epistemic modality is thus clear in terms of the Salem material considered here. However, it should be underscored that this is not a study of the full range or system of epistemic marking, which would require considering a number of features and constructions that do not mark source, including most of the modal auxiliaries (e.g. may, might), adverbs such as certainly, and adjectives such as sure. These clearly require a separate study, which together with this study of evidentials and their possible epistemic functions could 6 help piece together a larger picture of speaker stance or speaker evaluation in the Salem depositions (cf. Biber 2004) .
In addition to the problems of definition, there is not complete consensus about the categories of evidentiality, although the schemes that have been suggested clearly overlap (e.g. Chafe 1986, 263-69; Willett 1988, 56-57; Aikhenvald 2004, 63-64; Bednarek 2006, 644) . I will adopt a modified version of Aikhenvald's semantically-based taxonomy that is shown below and illustrated with examples from the Salem material. I will return to the identification of evidentials in the next section.
I) Sensory: information based on the five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.
I saw this willard suckle the Apparition of two black piggs on his breasts (RSWH, no. Evidence as an infallible mark did too far prevaile with us (RSWH, no. 745) IV) Quotative: information based on a report with or without a specific source.
the Rumer went that the sd martin had a brokn head at y t time but the deponent cannot speake to that vpon his owne knowlig (RSWH, no. 139 ; without specific source)
[…] their young daughter who was viseted with strang fitts & in her fitts (as her father & mother affirmed) did mention goodwife How the wife of James How Junior of Ipswich (RSWH, no. 284 ; with specific source)
Since Aikhenvald developed her taxonomy on the basis of present-day languages in which evidentiality is primarily encoded morphologically, some categories required modification to be more suitable for my English historical material. I merged Aikhenvald's categories of Visual and Non-visual Sensory into one category since English does not make the kind of significant distinctions that prompted Aikhenvald to make the initial separation. As I will demonstrate later, however, separation of evidential markers according to the five senses does yield some striking results. Aikhenvald (2004, 63) does not provide an exhaustive list of aspects covered by the category of Assumption, but says that it "may include logical reasoning, assumption, or simply general knowledge." I have incorporated markers of a number of cognitive processes that clearly point to the deponent's mental faculties as the source of information, including belief, remembrance, understanding, and opinion. Finally, Aikhenvald (2004, 64) has two categories for information based on reports: "Hearsay" for reports without a source, and "Quotative" for reports 8 with a source. Although the two do exhibit differing patterns in the Salem material (as we shall see), I prefer the term Quotative for both categories (with subdivision into with specific source and without specific source). This is to avoid confusion since the concept of "hearsay" in a legal sense, which may in fact cover both of Aikhenvald's categories, will be of importance in this study.
Material and Data Collection
My material consists of 389 witness depositions from the Salem witch trials, taken from the recent edition of the Salem documents, RSWH. 3 The depositions represent one or more deponents' retelling of their past experiences (what they did, saw, heard, etc.) pertaining to the case of an alleged witch. 4 The origin and transmission of these depositions must be carefully considered in linguistic studies since these aspects of the documents may influence the linguistic features in the texts. In accordance with a Massachusetts Bay Colony law from 1650 (Shurtleff 1854, 211) , depositions were usually not taken down in court. Instead, they were recorded in the home of the deponent, of a relative, or elsewhere. They were then filed with the clerk of the court, and if the deposition was admitted into evidence, the deponent would be called to swear to the testimony in court after it had been read out (for further discussion, see Grund 2007a, 4-5, 12-14; Grund et al. 2009; Grund forthcoming) . What is significant about this procedure for the purposes of this study is that the deposition could be written down by a number of different people: by the deponent himself or even possibly herself, or by a neighbor, relative, or hired writer; there was no requirement that the recorder be a clerk of the court. To what extent a recorder (if other than the deponent him-or herself) influenced the language recorded is unknown, but there are indications that the impact could be substantial (see e.g. Grund 2007b;
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Grund forthcoming; Grund and Walker 2011, 47-56) . 5 The usage of the evidentials should thus not necessarily be taken to be that of the deponent; rather, it is more useful to see it as a feature of the text, in many cases co-produced by the deponent and the recorder. The usage can thus be seen as the positioning of the evidence in terms of giving the source for the information, and not necessarily the positioning of the deponent, although the two are of course closely related (cf. the discussion of credibly in Fennell 2011, 28) .
The evidentials were collected from the material through what Bednarek (2006, 638-39) has termed a "text-driven approach." Since I was interested in seeing how the category of evidentiality was realized linguistically in the documents, I did not run automatic searches for a number of predetermined lexical or morphological forms or syntactic structures. Instead, the collection was done manually, and I included all forms and constructions that appeared to signal source of information. The approach was thus function-based rather than form-based. 6 As evidential markers are not morphological but lexical or syntactic in English, the identification is not always straightforward. A particular problem is that evidentiality may be just one of many functions/meanings of a lexical item or construction (see e.g. Whitt 2010, 23-27 ).
My identification is thus primarily based on semantics and context of the statement in the text. I was guided by the question "What source is provided for the statement/proposition/claim?" or "How does the deponent know what he/she claims to know?"
Even with this fairly straightforward approach, some uses required special treatment.
Following Whitt (2010, 79) , I do not include statements where the evidential markers are negated, such as in (2).
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(2) I neuar herd hur refil [= revile] eny parson that heth akusid hur with wichcraft (RSWH, no.
317).
Technically, in this and similar examples, it is the lack of source rather than the existence of a source that is indicated. Interestingly, signaling the absence of a source is particularly common in depositions that provide support for an alleged witch, where the deponent seems to attempt to refute a particular (explicit or implicit) accusation against the person in question. The implications of this strategy would be worth a special study, which is not within the scope of this article.
Furthermore, I did not include examples such as appeared in (3).
(3) There apeared a little blackheard [= black-haired] man to me in blackish aparill (RSWH, no.
122).
Although appear indirectly indicates visual experience, it does not point to a conscious strategy of providing a source for a statement. It also signals the action of appearance, rather than simple perception. This treatment agrees with that of Gisborne and Holmes (2007, 15-16) , who do not consider this kind of usage evidential. (See also the discussion of Sensory evidentials.)
The final and most problematic area of identification and classification involves discourse layers and Quotative markers. One of the defining features of depositions is that they can incorporate several discourse layers. While most depositions primarily consist of the deponent's narrative, sometimes the deponent reports on discussions that he or she has overheard, been told about, or participated in. A typical example is given in (4). Clear patterns emerge in terms of the linguistic realization of evidentiality in the Salem documents. Table 1 shows that evidentiality is predominantly expressed through verb phrases.
Overall, verb phrases make up 94% of the evidentials, with a split in frequency between Sensory and Quotative evidentials (both 95% and 97% respectively), on the one hand, and Inference and Assumption evidentials, on the other (88% and 86% respectively). However, within this general 14 category, there are also a number of constructions, and the different verb phrases take a number of different complementation patterns, as may be seen in (5)- (8).
(5) I beleue in my heart that martha cory is a dreadfull wicth (RSWH, no. 19; Assumption) (6) She semid to be a woman throu in that gret work of conuiktion and conuartion which I pray god mak us all (RSWH, no. 317; Inference) (7) thus our daughter continuing {about} two or three years constantli afirming to the <?> last that this goode how that is now seised was the cause of of her sorows (RSWH, no. 256; Quotative) (8) but he emmedetly was gon as she said (RSWH, no. 85; Quotative)
The most common construction involving evidential verb phrases is noun phrase + evidential verb phrase (in the present or past tense) + complementation, as in (5) and (6 and -ing clauses are the most frequent. Example (7) also shows that an alternative construction involving participles + complementation also occurs, but this is rare. So-called "comment clauses" (see Brinton 2008, esp. 2; Quirk et al. 1985 Quirk et al. , 1112 occur with some frequency, in particular involving Quotatives, as in (8).
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The Verb phrase + noun phrase (or the reversed Noun phrase + verb phrase) pattern is closely related to the Verb phrase category. Occurring very infrequently (2% or 27 out of 1542 instances of evidentials), this pattern covers closely linked combinations (or composite predicates) where the Verb phrase + noun phrase can be said to correspond to a simple verb (see e.g. Brinton and Akimoto 1999, 2) . In (9), for example, took notice can be said to correspond to noticed, which signals a sensory experience. However, some combinations involving the Noun phrase + verb phrase pattern are less closely connected, although the combination appears important for the evidential meaning to be expressed, as in (10), which indicates a Quotative (without a specific source). As can be seen, these combinations can occur with the same complementation patterns (that-clause, though in (9) that is left out) and in the same constructions (comment clause with as) as the verb phrases discussed earlier. This category (especially the composite predicates) thus underscores that verb phrases or verbal expressions are the main vehicles for evidential marking in the Salem depositions.
(9) upon the motion of hir finger we took notis they ware afflected (RSWH, no. 111) (10) I being at Groaton. some short tyme after John Willard. as the report went had beaten his wife I went to cal him home (RSWH, no. 485) Prepositional phrases involving the prepositions according to, by, in, and to and noun phrases of various degrees of complexity represent the second most common category of evidential construction at 3%. Examples are found in (11)- (13 Although (11) is Sensory, prepositional phrases particularly express Assumption as in (12)- (13), and often seem to suggest limitations in the deponents' knowledge or indicate "hedging," as I will show later.
The other categories (Noun phrase, Adverb, Adjective, and Other) are marginal, all scoring at or below 1%, exemplified in (14)- (17). (14) thare was a report that y the said hows wife hade said y thay we hade givin the mear <?> brimston and oyl and y the like (RSWH, no. 322) (15) It is perhaps slightly surprising that adverbs are so uncommon: the three instances of adverbs are all represented by seemingly (as in (15)). Adverbs are usually discussed extensively in studies of evidentiality in Present-Day English, although it should be noted that those studies usually merge epistemic and evidential markers, thus obscuring clearly evidential markers (as they are defined in this study). However, part of the reason is probably that, as the OED indicates, many evidential adverbs did not appear on the scene until long after the Salem witch trials (e.g.
allegedly, reportedly) or were very recent additions in the seventeenth century (e.g. reputedly,
reputatively), although some adverbs with potential evidential meaning, such as evidently, were in circulation at the time.
It is possible that the heavy reliance on verb phrases or verbal expressions is genrerelated, a hypothesis that would have to be tested on more varied material. At the same time, the frequency of the prepositional phrases (while marginal compared to verbs) shows that studies of evidentiality in English, which so far have focused on (a limited set of) verbs and adverbs, need to consider a broader inventory of constructions if we are to gain a full understanding of evidentiality in English.
Sensory
Sensory evidentials signal a direct, first-hand experience of an event through vision, hearing, touch, smell, or taste. Not unexpectedly, only vision and hearing appear with some frequency in the Salem depositions, while touch is rare, and smell and taste non-existent. Overall, this distribution mirrors Whitt's (2010, 219) Vision is by far the most frequent category, with 414 or 80% of the 517 instances (cf. Visual evidentials present some methodological challenges. Whitt (2010, 26 ) makes a distinction between two uses of see: one that simply indicates perception ("I see the house") and one that indicates source of information ("I see the house burning"). The distinction rests on the second sentence having two propositions and hence "contain [ing] [an] additional deictic component because it points to the speaker's evidence and does not solely indicate an act of perception" (Whitt 2010, 26 Straightforward examples (such as (19) ) usually involve the deponent observing the affliction of others. Although (20) does not have two clear propositions, it is clearly related, as it can be read as having two underlying propositions rather than simply signaling perception: "she saw" and "Good [being] upon her."
The problematic cases appear when there is no clear, explicit second proposition over which the verb phrase has scope; these cases could be classified as mere perception, if we follow Whitt (2010) strictly. These usually occur when the deponent observes the alleged witch and is 20 then afflicted by the witch, as in (21) However, classifying examples such as (21) and (22) as evidentials may not necessarily be diverging from Whitt (2010) , but instead expanding on his discussion. We might argue that these examples have an implicit second proposition (not expressed syntactically through a second verb phrase). In a sentence such as I saw the house, the existence of the house is (typically) taken for granted, while such an assumption is not necessarily true for a sentence such as I saw the witch. In this second sentence, the underlying proposition might be taken to be that the witch exists, and I saw marks the source of evidence for stating that existence. 10 After all, what appears to be at stake in examples such as (21) and (22) is indeed based on direct perception. Clarifying the identity of the alleged tormentor was undoubtedly a crucial part of the trial process. Consequently, at least in this trial context, all the usages in (19)-(23) seem possible to interpret as evidential and have thus been included in my study.
11
What is particularly striking about the visual evidentials is the context in which they occur. As hinted at above, the vast majority appears when deponents relate their own or others'
Peter J. . "The Nature Spectral evidence experienced by some of the accusers alone was at the heart of the controversy that was the Salem trials. The accusers would claim to be attacked by the accused's apparition and fall into spasmodic fits. Although there was no objective way for the magistrates to assess this evidence, it was accepted blindly by most of them. Not until after a massive offensive by civic leaders and powerful clerics was spectral evidence disallowed. This in turn brought about the gradual abandonment of the whole trial process (see Hoffer 1997, 78-79, 129-31; Rosenthal 2009, 25-26) .
The presence of a visual evidential may serve two overlapping functions in this context.
Specifically, it may be a way of anticipating a challenge of the source of the deponent's information: how indeed did the deponent know that it was the apparition of Martha Cory or Goody Esty (as shown in (24) and (25)) that attacked Mercy Lewis? The answer, plainly highlighted by the visual evidential, is that the deponent claims to have witnessed it first-hand, through direct visual experience. However, more generally, using a visual evidential may be part of a strategy to make spectral evidence more palatable or convincing: it was a way of making the immaterial, abstract specters more concrete, something that could be and was (allegedly) seen.
Peter J. . Kamensky (1997, 12-15) argues that listening and being able to accurately report what one had heard was a virtue among New Englanders, and a great deal of reliability was attributed to those rehearsed words. Indeed, according to Kamensky (1997, 13) , "only when ear-witnesses' exact words were accurately restated, closely examined, The category of Inference has some relation to the Sensory category in that the deponents' basis for inference frequently seems to be an underlying sensory experience, although its exact nature is usually unclear (Chafe 1986, 266; Bednarek 2006, 657, n. 11; Aijmer 2009, 68, 76 25 examination of a woman to discover so-called witches' teats, which would have been seen as a sure sign of allegiance with the devil (Hoffer 1997, 103) . However, considering that the deponents were unlikely to have been present during the examination, it is more likely that the ultimate basis for the inference is the report of the jury or what they have heard about the jury's deliberations (exactly how is unknown). According to Aikhenvald (2004, 373-74) , discussions of other people's "internal states" (such as the one in (29)) are often marked with inferential evidentials in other languages as well.
In both cases, the depositions highlight that the source of the information is indirect: they indicate a level of interpretation rather than a simple statement of direct observation. A number of studies suggest that seem in these kinds of contexts in Present-Day English (especially with infinitival complementation) has a function of a hedge, marking doubt or reservation (Aijmer 2009, 76 ; see also Gisborne and Holmes 2007, 10-11; Aikhenvald 2004, 165, 373 Assumption evidentials must thus be seen as potential hedges as well as potential boosters.
When the evidential is in the form of a prepositional phrase or in the form of a verb phrase within a comment clause (e.g. as I judged, as far as I know), the depositions often appear to highlight the deponents' limited scope of knowledge, allowing for other interpretations or for a mistake on the part of the deponents. In (30), for example, the deposition suggests by the inclusion of the comment clause that the statement of "three of the fingers" is an estimation and hence uncertain; 17 it leaves room for the possibility that it may have been more or fewer.
Similarly, in (31), the statement is not categorical, but limited to the deponent's understanding of the current situation and of the events reported on previously in the deposition (not included in the example). If indeed these formulations are hedges (as they appear to be), they may fall under the same category as inferential seem: they may contribute to less credibility of the evidence and the deponent (cf. Stygall's 1994, 138-39 , discussion of jurors' reaction to the expression in my opinion). However, the same caveats as discussed in the section of Inference apply.
Other instances of Assumption evidentials can more easily be accounted for as boosters of the reliability or relevance of the report provided in the depositions. Indeed, the very fact that (Labov and Waletzky 1967, 33, 37) . The Salem depositions very much resemble narratives as described by Labov and Waletzky (1967) , and the evaluation component is thus highly relevant for the depositions. For the deponents (and the recorders), it would have been crucial to avoid the "So what?" question, because doubt about the relevance of the deposition could presumably have prevented the deposition from being admitted into evidence and considered during the trial. The believe formula (as exemplified earlier) can have left no doubt about the deponents' evaluation and the claim of the relevance of the deposition to the case at hand: all of the experiences by the deponents translate into their conviction that the accused is indeed a witch. By its very Assumption status, then, the evidential verb believe would add to the 30 case built earlier, where the deponents reported on what was seen and heard. Evaluation, though subjective, would be needed for the narrative to be convincing.
To some (limited) extent, we can gauge the success of the formula by looking at whether a deposition that contains the formula was admitted into evidence either at the grand jury deliberations or at the trials (cf. fn. 15). Although caveats apply, there would seem to be a correlation between the use of the formula and admission into evidence: as many as 74 out of 79 (or 94%) of the depositions that contain a believe formula were used at either or both hearings, while five (or 6%) were not used at one or the other. The corresponding numbers for depositions that do not contain the formula (where admission can be determined) are: 57% admitted into either deliberations and 43% not admitted into either. This does seem to indicate that, although the formula was not necessary for admission into evidence, it may have been a contributing factor.
Quotative
In many ways, the Quotative category is the most complex. As indicated in the discussion on methodology, the Salem depositions frequently contain several discourse layers and a mixture of the deponents' narrative and their reports on discussions that they have overheard or participated in, cast as direct or indirect speech (see also Grund et al. 2009, 67) . These reported discussions also come in various guises and what is reported is not always straightforward "information."
That is, the report is not only a set of statements/propositions that are attributed to someone else's telling. Instead, we also find dialogues, questions and answers, predictions and hypothetical statements; and all are introduced with phrases that could potentially be interpreted as Quotative evidentials. The interpretation largely depends on how we interpret the concept of 31 "information" (see below). This presents some methodological challenges in terms of what to include or exclude. Table 2 divides up the instances of potential Quotatives into categories based on the type of "information" that they introduce; and Examples (33)-(38) below illustrate the main types listed in the Table 2 . (Since the focus is on "information" type, I give percentages for columns rather than rows.) Example (33) is straightforwardly evidential: the deposition ascribes the source of the information that the man's name was Jacobs to the man himself; the information was not prompted by a question or given as part of a dialogue between the deponent and the speaker (hence, non-dialogue). Even in (34), the usage appears to be evidential: the deposition could phrasing the statement as an answer is already conditioned by the preceding question. So, the motivation for "she told" could be attributed to the discourse structure rather than the wish to provide a source. At the same time, if the deponent and/or recorder had chosen to cast the deposition or the sequence as a narrative by the deponent, the statement could simply have been given as a fact, dropping the question and providing no source. It is possible that the preference for dialogue/reported speech over narrative should be seen as a general evidential strategy since the dialogue structure delineates clearly what information comes from the mouths of others.
Examples (36)- (38) are yet more complicated. (36) does not provide "information" per se that is backed up with a source indication; said heads a question. In (37), bid introduces a reported command or request. In (38), both the statements attributed to Martin are Martin's claims, one a claim that is true according to Martin and the other a prediction of the future. In this case (unlike in (34)), the statements could not hypothetically be presented without the phrases of saying, because it would change the meaning of the sentence: We had taken a false oath and We should never prosper… would indicate that the claims were made by the deponents rather than about them. These "Claims" frequently involve modal expressions, implying necessity, prediction, futurity, etc. Expressions of saying that introduce claims, questions, and commands would thus seem to be only marginally relevant to this evidentiality discussion.
However, again, it is possible that if the deposition had been framed as a narrative rather than as reported speech the same information could have been presented differently. For example, giving the statements in (38) as by Martin would thus be part of a larger strategy of evidentiality and hence providing a source for the information presented (as suggested above): the point would be to highlight that the statement is not the deponent's but that it is secondary, a statement that the accused made and could be held responsible for (if the attribution is believed). This requires a 34 broader conceptualization of information: any textual string in the deposition could be seen as information (whether in the form of a statement, question, claim) that could be indicated as coming from a source. Especially in a society that afforded a great deal of importance to language (see below), marking something as spoken by someone else (even if it is a question or command) would allow others to evaluate the language or the implications of the language allegedly used by a second party. In this study, I have thus been maximalist and included such cases, but future studies may want to refine this classification further. The choice to include "Claims," "Questions," etc. impacts primarily the overall frequency of the Quotative category, but has less of an impact on the qualitative aspect of the category, such as the constructions used:
the majority of specific markers are found with straightforward, non-dialogue statements as well, which are central to this category.
As with all the other categories, Quotatives are predominantly realized as verb phrases (725 of 748 instances, or 97%; see Table 1 that is alluded to in passing does not resurface again: the information thus seems to be backgrounded. Perhaps because of its background status, highlighting it as without a specific source was less risky or indeed of no concern since the information was only tangential to the real case at hand.
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The epistemic extensions and pragmatic functions that Quotative evidentials with a specific source may perform resemble those of the Assumption evidentials in that they span a great range and in that they are highly dependent on context. Most prominent among these seems to be the shifting of responsibility for the statement from the deponent to someone else, which may have several different semantic repercussions. In (41), for example, by attributing the statement explicitly to George Burroughs (the accused), the deponent underscores that Burroughs himself confessed to making a woman a witch.
(41) also he tould me that he made: Abigaill Hoobs: a wicth (RSWH, no. 124) Putting the words into the mouth of the accused probably added to the believability of the case, especially in a society that put a great deal of weight on accurately rehearsed words, as Kamensky (1997, 12-15) suggests (see also the discussion of Sensory auditory evidentials).
Indeed, Kamensky (1997, 152-54, 160) argues convincingly that language and words were a central part of witch trials; men and women were believed to reveal themselves as witches and wizards and to be in league with the devil through their use of language that did not fit especially Puritan norms (including cursing, lying, threats, etc.). Paying close attention to what people said was thus crucial to ferreting out potential witches. This belief in the power of language may go a long way to account for the frequency with which words are ascribed to or reported as given by alleged witches and apparitions in the Salem depositions.
By using Quotatives, deponents may also disassociate themselves from the statement and suggest that the statement may be uncertain or even false (cf. Biber 2004, 111) . This strategy may be behind the usage in (42).
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(42) our dog bit hir by the leg as she said (RSWH, no. 351) Although Susannah Martin, an alleged witch, claimed that she had been bitten by the dog, the deponent, Elizabeth Clark, may imply that Martin's statement is false, that she simply made it up. After all, Clark is not reporting the incident as fact (Our dog bit her by the leg). Similar uses of Quotatives are found in a number of other languages (Aikhenvald 2004, 180, 182, 375) .
From a modern perspective, the frequent references to what other people have told the deponents are surprising. In a present-day courtroom (at least in the USA), many of the statements that are supported with Quotatives in the Salem depositions would be inadmissible:
they would be seen as hearsay, since the deponents do not claim to have first-hand knowledge of the claims of the statements; they are simply rehearsing the experiences of others (Black's Law Dictionary s.v. hearsay; Stygall 1994, 138) . However, the attitude towards hearsay differed in the seventeenth century, where the notion was quite complicated and in flux, as shown by Langbein (2003) . Although objections were sometimes voiced in seventeenth-century trials, it is not until the mid-eighteenth century that a clearly negative attitude to hearsay evidence emerges in the legal system in England (Langbein 2003, 233-42) . The situation in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, on the other hand, is unclear, and little seems to have been written on the hearsay rule in early colonial times. 20 However, there is both direct and indirect support for the claim that hearsay was readily accepted in Salem, and that hearsay was thus treated in a similar way as in England. Although a number of practical guides and law books were undoubtedly available to the Salem magistrates on which to base their proceedings, one of the prime sources is likely to have been Michael Dalton's A Country Justice, first issued in 1618 and re-issued in a number of 38 subsequent editions in the seventeenth century (Hoffer 1998, 7; Rosenthal 2009, 18) . The 1690 edition, the latest edition at the time of the Salem trials, does not appear to include a discussion of hearsay per se. However, in the description of different categories of witnesses, it is stated that "[i]f one be an Accuser upon his own knowledge, sight or hearing, and he shall utter the same to another, that other may be an Accuser" (Dalton 1690, 408 ). This at least seems to imply that the evidence put forward by this second accuser, even if secondary, would be accepted, and hence that the Salem magistrates would have had precedent for using such evidence.
More directly, the depositions themselves attest to the practice of considering hearsay as Despite our modern objections to this kind of evidence, it is clear that it was frequently used and that the use was probably sanctioned by legal procedure. More generally, the frequency and standing of reported evidence may perhaps again be related to the importance afforded to speech and hearing in New England (as suggested by Kamensky 1997, 12-15) : if listening and rehearsing words was a valued skill, it may have been natural to at least consider re-tellings of other people's experiences as valid evidence. The frequency of occurrences shows that a more important distinction for the Salem authorities or the community at large may have been the one between statements with a specific source and those without a specific source: the number of the latter category is very limited and the examples are mostly peripheral, as shown above.
Concluding Remarks
As this study has shown, the Salem deponents and the recorders of their depositions made use of a number of features to mark where the information contained in the depositions came from. The fact that verbs predominate perhaps justifies previous studies' focus on verbs. However, the functional approach adopted in this study (that is, not limiting the study to pre-selected features) reveals that other constructions also appear to carry evidential meaning, most notably prepositional phrases and phrases involving verb phrases in combination with noun phrases.
Studying the full semantic range of evidentiality also showed the relative frequency of different semantic categories. Marking is particularly prominent in terms of evidence based on seeing, hearing, or reports from second-hand sources, while Inference and various notions collected under the umbrella term of Assumption are less commonly marked. I suggest that this should probably be seen as a reflection of the nature of the legal material and the larger context of New England and especially Puritan jurisprudence and communal values. Direct sensory experience as well as the purported (usually self-incriminatory) statements of alleged witches was at the center of the experiences of the deponents and the evidence that they reported. Viewed from the perspective of the legal process and of the community more generally, markers of different semantic categories can be said to have different pragmatic or discourse-related functions, often restricted to certain contexts. Markers of seeing may have been employed to provide support for spectral evidence in particular, while Quotatives could help to highlight that the report consisted of the accused's very words, which would have held a premium among New
Englanders. Even clearly evaluative markers such as believe seem to have promoted the relevance and authority of the deponents' narratives. My findings thus suggest that marking the source of information was a very deliberate strategy in many Salem depositions. In a trial process (including pre-hearings and grand jury procedures), it was presumably important to establish the basis of the deponents' claims in order to evaluate the reliability of the information, and source marking appears often to be employed in order to emphasize the credibility and reliability of the evidence (cf. Pomerantz 1984, 613; Fennell 2011, 28-29) .
Overall, this study demonstrates that evidentiality, even if it is signaled lexically or syntactically instead of morphologically, is a valid category of investigation in English. It also makes clear that studying evidentiality can give insights not only into the deployment of various linguistic features in the Salem documents, but also the potential power of the words in terms of positioning the evidence of the depositions. Clearly, to fully understand the Salem depositions, we need to pay attention to the way the deponents' information is presented, not only to what information is provided. In turn, in order to fully understand the language, we need to contextualize it within the particular socio-cultural and legal setting that was the Salem witch trials (see also Hiltunen 2010) .
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More studies of early North American material that consider other features from this kind of perspective are needed to reveal the close connection between context and language that is so familiar to us from present-day circumstances. More specific results of this study should also be pursued in other studies to see if the findings (such as the heavy reliance on verbs) may be specific to Salem or to the genre of deposition. A missing piece of the puzzle is to investigate systematically how the contexts where marking occurs relate to contexts where no marking appears, which would present special challenges, as I have argued. 3 Multiple depositions sometimes appear in the same document and are hence labeled under the same number in RSWH (e.g. nos. 14 and 18). These have been counted as separate depositions in this study. I excluded depositions that do not survive in manuscript but only come down to us in, usually much later, editions (e.g. RSWH, nos. 643, 645, 646, 647) . If a deposition survives in more than one copy, I include only one copy (e.g. RSWH, nos. 497 and 498). I also excluded 15 depositions that did not contain any evidentials.
